AWS SSO is now called AWS IAM Identity Center. AWS renamed it on 26 July 2022, and it is offered at no extra charge. It gives your people one login to your AWS accounts and AWS applications, with permissions set in one place instead of an IAM user in every account.
The old name survives where it would break things to change it: the CLI is still aws configure sso and aws sso login, and console and API addresses still contain sso. Everything below is from AWS's own IAM Identity Center documentation, as we read it on 27 October 2026.
What IAM Identity Center is
IAM Identity Center is where your workforce's AWS access lives. You either create users directly in it, or connect your existing identity provider (the service that already holds your people's accounts, such as Google Workspace, Okta or Microsoft Entra ID) and sync users from there. Then you give those users access to AWS accounts, through permission sets (below), and to AWS managed applications, such as Amazon Redshift or Amazon Quick, as well as your own SAML apps.
People sign in once to the AWS access portal and see every account and role they are allowed, with links to the console and to short-lived CLI credentials.
There are two kinds of instance. An organization instance runs in your AWS Organizations management account; AWS calls it the best practice, and it is the only kind that can manage access to AWS accounts. An account instance is tied to one account and only supports some AWS applications. For a small team with more than one AWS account, you want the organization instance.
On price, AWS's IAM Identity Center FAQ says it is "offered at no extra charge". You pay for the AWS resources people use, not for the login.
Choosing an identity source
AWS's page on managing your identity source says you can have only one identity source per organization, and offers three. The Identity Center directory is the default when you first enable the service: you create users and groups by hand in AWS. Active Directory, on-premises or AWS-managed, suits companies that already run it. An external identity provider such as Okta, Entra ID or Google Workspace means people log in with the account they already have.
For a company on Google Workspace, the external provider is the obvious pick, because it means one fewer list of people to keep. You can start on the built-in directory and switch later: AWS's notes on changing source say that moving between the Identity Center directory and an external provider preserves users, groups, memberships and assignments, as long as the new provider's SAML Name ID matches the user names already in AWS. Moving to Active Directory is the one direction that deletes them.
MFA moves with the choice. With an external provider, AWS says that provider handles MFA, so the two-step verification rules you set in Google apply to AWS too.
Using Google Workspace as the identity source
If your company runs on Google Workspace, making Google the source lets people sign in to AWS with their Google account, and new hires appear in AWS automatically. AWS's Google Workspace tutorial sets it up in five steps.
First, in the Google Admin console, add the Amazon Web Services (SAML) app from Google's catalog and download Google's IdP metadata. Then, in IAM Identity Center, go to Settings, choose Change identity source, pick External identity provider, and upload Google's metadata. Copy AWS's ACS URL and issuer URL.
Back in Google, paste those into the app, set the Name ID to the person's primary email, and turn the app on for the people who need AWS. AWS suggests an organizational unit or group rather than everyone. Next, in IAM Identity Center, enable automatic provisioning. It shows a SCIM endpoint and an access token once only, so copy both. Finally, in Google, configure auto-provisioning with that endpoint and token, choose when removals take effect, and switch it to Active.
The sync uses SCIM 2.0, the standard API for creating and removing accounts (what is SCIM?). AWS lists some limits worth knowing before you start.
Users only, no groups. Automatic sync from Google covers users; group provisioning "is not supported at this time". You create groups in IAM Identity Center with the AWS CLI or API, or use ssosync, an open-source tool from AWS Labs, to copy Google groups across.
Complete profiles only. Every user needs a first name, last name, username and display name in Google, and a single value for attributes such as phone number, or the sync fails for them.
It uses one of Google's provisioning slots. Google allows automated provisioning into 3 apps on Business Starter and 100 on higher editions (Google Workspace SSO has the details).
Provisioning usually completes within minutes, but AWS says it can take up to 24 hours.
Permission sets
A permission set is a template of IAM policies: "read-only", "developer", "admin". You assign a person or group a permission set in one or more AWS accounts, and Identity Center creates and manages a matching IAM role in each of those accounts. Change the permission set and every role follows.
You can start from predefined permission sets, each built on one AWS managed policy such as AdministratorAccess, PowerUserAccess or ReadOnlyAccess, or build custom ones from your own policies. A small team rarely needs more than three:
| Permission set | Who gets it | Based on |
|---|---|---|
| Admin | One or two people | AdministratorAccess |
| Developer | Engineers | PowerUserAccess |
| Read-only | Anyone who only needs to look | ReadOnlyAccess |
There is also a predefined Billing permission set for whoever pays the invoices. If you think of these as roles, you are right; role-based access control is the same idea applied to every tool.
AWS's advice is to give admins a lesser permission set too and use it day to day, which is the principle of least privilege in practice. Each permission set also has a session duration: how long a console or CLI session lasts before AWS signs the person out. The default is one hour and the maximum is 12. Keep it short; it matters when someone leaves.
The CLI login
This is the part most people search for. With Identity Center set up, developers stop keeping long-lived access keys on their laptops. Per AWS's CLI guide:
$ aws configure sso
SSO session name (Recommended): my-sso
SSO start URL [None]: https://my-sso-portal.awsapps.com/start
SSO region [None]: us-east-1
SSO registration scopes [None]: sso:account:access
The CLI opens a browser for the sign-in, then asks which account and role to use, a default region and a profile name. It writes a profile and an sso-session section to ~/.aws/config. After that, each day:
$ aws sso login --profile my-dev-profile
$ aws s3 ls --profile my-dev-profile
$ aws sso logout
The login token is cached in ~/.aws/sso/cache, and the CLI refreshes the short-lived AWS credentials itself while that token is valid. From CLI version 2.22.0 the browser sign-in uses PKCE and must happen on the same machine; add --use-device-code for the older flow that lets you approve on another device.
How long a session lasts
There are two clocks, and the difference matters on someone's last day. AWS's page on authentication sessions says the access portal session, created when someone signs in, can be configured to last up to 90 days. The IAM role sessions that the console and CLI use are separate: once started, they run for the permission set's duration, up to 12 hours, "regardless of the status of the original sign-in session".
AWS also says Identity Center doesn't support SAML Single Logout. Signing out of Google does not sign anyone out of AWS. That is not a flaw so much as a fact to plan around: removing access is a deliberate act, not a side effect.
Removing someone's AWS access
This is where the details matter. The same sessions page spells out what happens when a user is disabled or deleted in Identity Center:
| What stops | When |
|---|---|
| Signing in to the AWS access portal | Immediately |
| Starting new console or CLI sessions | Immediately |
| Existing sessions in AWS applications | Within 30 minutes |
| Existing AWS account (IAM role) sessions | When they expire: the permission set's duration, up to 12 hours |
So a removal is not instant. Do it in this order.
End their sessions first. An admin can end a user's active sessions from the Identity Center console. Do this before anything is deleted: AWS's notes on changing identity source say you cannot revoke a user's sessions from the console once the user has been deleted.
Then suspend the person in Google Workspace. With provisioning on, Google passes the change to AWS on the schedule you chose: within 24 hours, or after 1, 7 or 30 days. For leavers, pick the shortest.
Remember open role sessions run out on their own. A one-hour session duration caps the exposure at an hour; a 12-hour one doesn't.
Check for anything outside Identity Center. IAM users and access keys created directly in an account are separate from Identity Center and are not touched by any of this. Delete them, or rotate keys the person knew.
Remove them from groups you created by hand, since Google doesn't sync groups.
The same timings apply to people who change jobs, not only leavers. Removing someone from a group or an account assignment stops new sessions at once, but an open role session keeps working until it expires. Revoking access covers that gap across other tools, and the full sequence for every tool, not only AWS, is in the employee offboarding checklist.
Where SmashSSO fits
IAM Identity Center is free, and with Google as its source it already follows your directory. Do it. Your other tools are the problem: most only accept SSO or automatic provisioning on an expensive plan, which is the SSO tax.
SmashSSO handles those. It is not SSO; it doesn't touch how anyone logs in. It reads your people from Google Workspace, shows who has an account in each tool and with what role, and invites, changes and removes people by role, through a tool's member API where you have added a token, or through an agent in your own Chrome where you are already signed in as an admin. That browser has to be open, and agent runs are slower than an API and can fail when a tool redesigns its screens. When someone is suspended in Google, it alerts you and shows where they still have access. The tools page lists what it covers.
It costs a flat fee from $199 a month billed annually (pricing).