To revoke access for a former employee properly, you have to end four things: their account in every tool, the sessions they still have open, the tokens and integrations they created, and the shared passwords they knew. Suspending their main Google or Microsoft account handles only part of the first, and only for tools they sign in to through it.
If you have just found an ex-employee with a live login, do the four things in that order today, then come back for the rest of this post: how access lingers, what can actually go wrong, how to check you got everything and how to stop it happening again.
How access lingers
Almost nobody leaves access in place on purpose. It survives because each of these looks finished when it is not.
The main account is suspended, and that feels like the end. It is the end of Google sign-in. Any tool with its own email and password is untouched. Meanwhile, sessions outlive accounts: a tool that was open in their browser yesterday may still be open today. Some tools end sessions when you remove the person, some only when the session expires.
Tokens are not logins. Personal API tokens, SSH keys, OAuth grants to third-party apps and webhooks keep working with no one signed in. Shared logins have no owner either: the social media account, the domain registrar, the supplier portal. Nobody removes a person from a password they simply know.
Then there are accounts under other emails. Their personal address, used to sign up for a tool before the company had a policy, matches nothing in your directory. And there are things shared by link. A document shared "anyone with the link" stays readable by anyone who saved the link, whether or not they have an account.
Code is its own case. GitHub's help page on removing a member says, as we read it on 27 October 2026, that removed members lose access to private forks of your private repositories but may still have local copies, and that making sure they delete confidential material is your responsibility. Revoking access ends their reach into your systems. It cannot pull back what is already on their laptop.
What can go wrong
You do not need breach statistics to see the problem. Walk through what a live login actually allows.
Shared documents. Proposals, pricing, board updates, hiring plans. A former employee who can still open your drive, wiki or project tool can read whatever was shared with them, including things written after they left.
Paid seats. Every account left behind is a seat you pay for, every month, until someone notices. In Google Workspace, Google says suspended accounts are still charged at the same rate as active ones (Google's suspension help). Other tools vary.
Customer data. Access to your CRM or support desk is access to your customers' names, emails, messages and sometimes payment details. That is data you have promised, in your privacy policy and often in contracts, to protect.
Open sessions. A laptop they kept, or their personal browser, may still be signed in to tools you thought you had closed. They might not even know.
Integrations that run as them. An automation built under their account either keeps running with their permissions, or breaks the moment you remove them and takes a business process down with it. Both happen.
Honest mistakes. Most former employees with access never use it deliberately. They still get notifications, receive customer emails, or post in the wrong workspace. Customers may still see them listed as their contact. None of this is a crime story, and all of it is avoidable.
Revoking properly: sessions, tokens, shared passwords
Sessions. End them explicitly. In Google Workspace, Google says suspending a user automatically resets their sign-in cookies, which signs them out of browsers and mobile devices, but it does not sign them out of desktop apps such as Google Drive for desktop (Google's sign-out help). In other tools, look for "sign out of all sessions" or check what deactivation does. Slack, for one, says a deactivated member is signed out on all devices and cannot sign back in (Slack's help).
Passwords. Changing someone's password does not necessarily end their sessions. Google's own help says a user is signed out of all active sessions after you reset both the password and the sign-in cookies, which is two steps, not one (Google's password reset help). A password change in Google also revokes only some third-party access automatically: Google's page on the subject covers mail apps and apps using mail scopes, not every app.
Tokens and integrations. In Google Workspace, an admin can revoke third-party app access from the user's security settings. In each other tool, look for personal access tokens, SSH keys, deploy keys, OAuth apps they authorized and webhooks they created. Move anything the business needs to an account you own before you revoke it.
Shared passwords. Change every shared login they knew. Then check the second factor: if the shared account's two-factor codes were set up on their phone, a new password changes nothing for them. Reset the two-factor method too. Shared accounts explains how to get out of this pattern.
Every other tool. Deactivate them, by the email they actually used. The IT offboarding checklist covers the full order, and Google Workspace offboarding covers the transfer of their mail and Drive files before anything is deleted. Deactivate rather than delete at this stage: what deprovisioning is explains why the difference matters.
When to revoke: resignations and dismissals
Timing depends on how the person is leaving.
For a resignation, access usually ends at the close of their last working day. Before that point, revoke anything they no longer need for the handover, starting with admin and owner roles. A person who is leaving in two weeks rarely needs to be the only owner of your billing account in the meantime.
For a dismissal, revoke access while the conversation is happening, not after. Have the list ready, and have someone ready to work through it at the agreed minute. The employee termination checklist covers the order and who does what.
For someone who left a while ago and has just been found in a tool, the timing is now. Do the removal first and the investigation second.
Checking it worked
Revocation you have not checked is revocation you hope happened. Before you call it done, search each tool's member list for their name, company email and any personal email. Look at "last active" or sign-in logs, where the tool has them, for activity after their leaving date. In Google Workspace, check that their third-party app access is empty and that their mail has no forwarding to a personal address. Check documents they owned for "anyone with the link" sharing, and tighten what matters. And confirm the seat count fell in each paid tool, because removing a person and lowering a bill are separate steps in many tools.
If you find activity after the leaving date, write down what and when before you change anything else, and talk to a lawyer if it looks deliberate.
Is it a legal problem if an ex-employee still has access?
It can be, depending on where you are, what data they can reach and what your contracts promise. Data protection laws such as the GDPR expect personal data to be kept secure, and customer contracts and security questionnaires often ask how you control access. An ex-employee with a live login to your CRM is hard to square with either. This is not legal advice: remove the access first, keep a record of what you found and what you did, and ask a lawyer about your specific situation.
At 5 people and at 50
At five people, everyone knows everyone's tools, and the most likely leftover is a shared password or a personal-email account from the early days. Spend the time on those.
At fifty, the most likely leftover is a tool nobody remembered. The person who left joined it two years ago for a project, and it is not on any list. That is where the record of who has what earns its keep, and where a quarterly check against every tool's member list finds what the offboarding missed. Orphaned accounts covers that clean-up.
Preventing it next time
Most lingering access comes from not knowing what was given. Fix that and the rest follows.
Record access when you grant it; provisioning and deprovisioning explains why the removal list should be written at the moment of access. Run integrations from accounts the company owns, not from individual employees' tokens. Use company email for every account, so one directory covers everyone. And review access regularly: the user access review post has a process for a small team.
The full leaving process, from notice to the week after, is in the employee offboarding checklist.
Where SmashSSO fits
SmashSSO is built for the "where do they still have access?" question. It reads your people from Google Workspace, and when someone is suspended there it alerts you and shows every tool where they still have an account, from an access grid matched by email; accounts that match nobody in your directory are flagged too. You remove them from there, through a tool's member API where you have added a token, otherwise through an agent in your own Chrome. Every change is recorded in an audit log.
It removes accounts. It does not rotate shared passwords, revoke every token a person created, or touch devices and files, so the other steps above remain yours. Agent-run removals need your Chrome open and can fail when a tool redesigns its screens; a failed run says so and shows its last screenshot. Some tools' terms restrict automated use. It is not SSO. It costs a flat fee from $199 a month, billed annually (pricing).