Shared accounts are logins used by more than one person: the company's social media account, the "admin@" owner of a tool, the single seat the whole team signs into. They save money and setup time. The bill comes later, when someone who knew the password leaves and you cannot tell what they can still reach.
Shared accounts are sometimes the only option. When they are, keep them in a password manager's shared vault, give each one an owner, and change the password every time someone with access leaves. When they are not the only option, replace them with one account per person.
Why teams share accounts
Nobody shares a password because they think it is good security. They share for ordinary reasons.
Seat cost is the most common. A tool charges per user, three people need it occasionally, so one seat gets shared. Sometimes the tool only allows one login: some social platforms, supplier portals, government sites, domain registrars and older systems have one account per company, or charge heavily for more.
Then there is the owner account. Someone created the tool's account with a generic address, like ops@ or admin@, so it would survive staff changes, and now several people know its password. Speed plays a part too: a new hire needs access today, and logging in as a colleague is faster than adding a user. And shared inboxes such as support@ or sales@ get read by several people logging into the mailbox directly.
Some of these are fixable, some are not. Seat-saving is the one most often regretted.
The risks
No accountability. The tool's log says "admin@ deleted the project". Which of four people? NIST's security control catalog, SP 800-53, has a control (AC-2(9)) that restricts shared and group accounts for exactly this reason: they come with increased risk because nobody is accountable for what they do.
Leavers keep access. Removing a person from a shared account means changing the password and telling everyone else the new one. If that step is missed, the person who left can still log in, and nothing in your directory will show it. Suspending their Google account does nothing here, because they never used it to log in. That is how shared logins turn into orphaned accounts that nobody owns.
The password spreads. Shared passwords end up in chat threads, documents and personal password managers. Every copy is one you will not know to delete.
MFA ties it to one phone. If the account has two-step verification, the codes often go to whoever set it up. They leave, and the account is locked, or worse, they still receive the codes.
Terms of service. Many tools license accounts to a single person. GitHub's terms of service, for example, say "a single login may not be shared by multiple people" (they do allow separate machine accounts for automation). Google says in its admin help that its accounts are meant for one person, and warns that sharing one can trigger security challenges and lockouts for everyone using it.
Is sharing an account against terms of service? For many tools, yes. Check each tool's terms before you rely on a shared seat. A tool that finds out can suspend the account, and "we were saving a seat" is not a defense.
Password sharing done properly: a password manager
When an account must be shared, a business password manager is the right home for it. It does three things a spreadsheet or a chat message cannot: it controls who can see each password, it fills it in without people copying it around, and it lets you take access away.
Both of the common business password managers do this with shared spaces and permissions, according to their own help pages as we read them on 27 October 2026.
1Password uses shared vaults. You share a vault with people or groups, and set permissions per person or group. On 1Password Teams those are Allow Viewing, Allow Editing and Allow Managing. 1Password Business has finer item permissions (view, create, edit, archive, delete) and settings that control copying passwords, exporting and sharing items outside 1Password.
Bitwarden uses collections inside an organization, with permission levels from View items to Manage collection, including options that hide passwords. Bitwarden is honest about the limit: users may still use hidden passwords via autofill, and hiding them does not completely prevent access.
That caveat applies to every password manager. Anyone who can use a password can, with a little effort, learn it. Hidden passwords reduce casual copying; they do not remove the need to rotate when people leave.
How do you manage shared passwords well? Five rules make it work. First, keep one vault or collection per group of shared accounts, such as "Marketing social" or "Finance portals", shared only with the people who need them. Second, give each shared account a named owner, written in the item's notes along with why it is shared. Third, put MFA inside the vault: where the tool supports authenticator codes, store the code in the shared item if your plan supports one-time codes, or use a security key kept by the owner, so MFA does not depend on one person's phone. Fourth, point the recovery email to a group, not a person, so the account's recovery or contact address outlives any one employee. Fifth, keep a register: a short list of every shared account, its owner, who has access and the date of the last password change. It is also what an auditor asks for.
Rotation at offboarding
Should you rotate shared passwords when someone leaves? Yes, every shared password they could see, whether they left on good terms or not. "They would never" is not a control. The routine runs in this order.
List what they could reach. Every vault or collection they belonged to, plus anything shared outside the password manager. The register makes this quick.
Remove them from the password manager first, so they cannot see the new passwords as you set them.
Rotate in order of damage. Money first: banking portals, payment providers, ad accounts with spend. Then anything with customer data, then social and marketing accounts, then the rest.
Fix the second factor. If MFA codes went to their phone or a security key they kept, re-enroll it.
End their sessions where the tool allows it. Many tools have "sign out of all sessions" or "log out other devices"; a new password alone may not end a session already open.
Check recovery details. Make sure the account's recovery email and phone are not theirs.
Record it. Date, account, who rotated it. Your employee offboarding checklist should have a line for this, and revoking access covers the wider sequence.
If this routine is long every time someone leaves, that is the signal to replace shared accounts rather than manage them.
A worked example
Take a 12-person agency. Marketing shares the company's social accounts, the ad account and a stock-photo subscription. Finance shares the bank portal and the payroll provider's admin login. One person in operations owns the domain registrar, with codes going to their phone.
When a marketing coordinator leaves, the register says they could reach four items in the "Marketing" vault. The ad account comes first, because it can spend money; then the social accounts, then the stock-photo seat. Fifteen minutes, recorded. Nothing in finance changes, because they were never in that vault.
Now imagine there is no register and the passwords live in a shared document. Nobody can say which logins the coordinator saw, so the honest answer is all of them, including the bank portal. That is the real cost of informal sharing: not the leak you know about, but the rotation you can't scope.
Alternatives
The best shared account is the one you turned into individual ones.
One account per person, with the right role. If the issue is cost, compare a few extra seats with the risk and the rotation work. Often a cheaper role, such as viewer or guest, is enough for occasional users. Role-based access control shows how to decide which role each job gets.
Delegation instead of logins. Many tools let one person act on behalf of another or a shared resource without sharing a password: delegated mailboxes, page or ad account roles on social platforms, team access in supplier portals. For email, Google suggests aliases, delegated mailboxes and shared inboxes in place of a shared Google account.
A company-owned owner account, used rarely. For tools that need one top-level owner, use a group address, keep its password in the vault, give everyday work to individual admin accounts, and sign in as the owner only when needed.
Machine accounts for automation, where the tool allows them, owned by a named person and reviewed like any other account.
Can SSO replace shared accounts? Not directly. SSO logs in a specific person through your identity provider, so it cannot represent "the four people in marketing" as one account. What it does is make individual accounts easier to manage, which removes one reason people share. But SSO is often on the tool's most expensive plan (the SSO tax), and a shared login does not become safe because the other tools use SSO. SSO vs a password manager covers which tool solves which problem.
Where SmashSSO fits
SmashSSO makes the "one account per person" alternative cheaper to run. It reads your people from Google Workspace with read-only access and shows, in one access grid, who has an account in each tool and with which role, matched by email. Accounts that match nobody in your directory, which is where shared logins like admin@ and social@ show up, are flagged so you can decide what each one is. Inviting people by role and removing them when they leave runs from the same place, through a tool's member API where you have added a token or an agent in your own Chrome otherwise. Any step that would add a paid seat waits for your approval.
It does not store or rotate passwords; that is the password manager's job. It is not SSO, and it costs a flat fee from $199 a month, billed annually (pricing). The quarterly user access review is where shared accounts get checked alongside everyone else's.